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Abstract
This study examines the effect of investor protection on the firm value, either directly
or through the implementation of corporate governance as an intervening variable
in 10 countries in Asia. Investor protection as independent variable was measured
by the score of investor protection consisting of legal tradition, corporate law and
enforcement, and securities law. Firm value as the dependent variable was measured
with Tobin’s q. The research hypotheses were tested using partial least square model.
This study found that investor protection had no significant impact on firm value,
but it did have a significant impact on corporate governance, which further had a
significant impact on firm value; hence, investor protection had significant impact
on firm value with the implementation of corporate governance as mediating variable.
Keywords: investor protection, corporate governance, firm value, corporate
governance score
1. Introduction
Investment is a commitment to invest some funds at the current time with the aim
of obtaining profits in the future (Tandelilin, 2010: 1). Before investing, investors will
certainly choose a company that will provide benefits for it. One way to look at a com-
pany’s performance is through its value. High corporate value is undoubtedly followed
by high prosperity of shareholders. High corporate values in addition to reflecting good
company performance at that time can also reflect future prospects.
Management of the company also relates to corporate value. A company will get
higher value when they deal with better corporate governance, ensuring the higher
value of the company. This is in accordance with corporate governance definition
according to the National Committee on Governance Policy that corporate governance
is one of the pillars of the market economy system because corporate governance is
closely related to the trust companies apply to it as well as the business climate of a
country.
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Muryati and Suardhika (2014) examined the influence of corporate governance on
corporate valueswith internalmechanisms (managerial ownership, independent board
of commissioners, boards of directors, independent audit committees, and external
institutional ownership mechanisms) in banking companies listed on BEI in 2009–2012
and found that corporate governance had an effect on corporate value. Siallagan and
Machfoedz (2006) examined the relationship between corporate governance and the
quality of the firm’s earnings and values. The results of the study found that corporate
governance affects the quality of earnings, the quality of profit affects firm values, and
corporate governance affects firm value.
The legal approach of La Porta et al. (2002) in 27 countries with a prosperous econ-
omy found that the better the investor protection impacted, the better the company’s
value. La Porta et al. (2000) have proven that, in some countries, expropriation by
managers and controlling shareholders of minority shareholders and creditors is enor-
mous. They also state that the law and the quality of its implementation are important
determinants of what rights the securities holders hold and how well those rights are
protected. According to Klapper and Love (2004), the legal environment relating to the
protection of investors in a country will affect the application of corporate governance
at the corporate level.
Klapper and Love (2004) examined investor protection relationships against corpo-
rate governance and market valuation. The results of this study found that the better
the corporate governance, the better the market valuation. Corporate governance is
important for companies in countries with weak investor protection. Corporate gover-
nance is seen to compensate for weak investor protection. Wardhani (2009) examined
the effect of investor protection on the implementation of corporate governance in
Asian countries. The results of this study found that investor protection has a positive
effect on the implementation of corporate governance.
Previous studies have examined the effect of investor protection on corporate gov-
ernance and the influence of corporate governance on corporate value. However,
these studies have not considered the implementation of corporate governance, which
may be additional in the protection of investors as intervening variables in estimat-
ing the effect of investor protection on firm value. Previous researches underlie the
researcher’s examination of the influence between investor protection, corporate gov-
ernance implementation, and firm value on companies listed in Asian stock exchanges
in the range of 2010–2012.
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The results of this study are expected to academically increase the knowledge and
understanding of the relationship of investor protection, corporate governance imple-
mentation, and corporate values as well as provide a reference and basis for con-
ducting further research. As for practice, it can be used as input and consideration of
management in decision-making relevant to the company.
2. Literature Reviews
2.1. Agency theory
Agency theory is defined as one in which one or more people (investors) involve oth-
ers (agents) to perform some services on their behalf, one ofwhich includes delegating
authority over decision-making to agents ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problem
here is that financiers and agents can choose different actions because of differences
in risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989).
2.2. Signaling theory
Brigham and Houston (2006) argue that signaling theory is a behavior of corporate
management in giving direction to investors related to management views on the
prospects of the company for the future. Ross (1977) stated that the company signals
for the market to gain insight about the quality of the company.
2.3. Investor protection
Investor protection can be defined as degree to which law and its enforcement pro-
tect investors from insiders’ expropriation. La Porta et al. (1996) explain how investor
protection is done through the mechanisms of a legal tradition, law and enforcement,
and securities law. La Porta et al. (1996) classified this according to legal origin, divided
into two major groups: common law and civil law. A country with legal origin common
law protects its investors better for minority shareholders compared to countries with
legal origin civil law (La Porta et al., 1996).
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2.4. Corporate governance
Blair (1995 cited in Fransisca, 2005) defines corporate governance as the whole of the
legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that govern: (i) what a public company
can do; (ii) who has the right to control the company; (iii) how controls are performed;
and (iv) how the risks and returns on the shares of the activities undertaken by the
enterprise are allocated. The Forum for Corporate Governance Indonesia (FCGI) says
there are several benefits of corporate governance: companies are easier to raise
capital, lower capital costs, improve business and economic performance, and give
effect to stock prices.
2.5. Firm value
The value of the firm is the price that would be paid by the prospective buyer if the
company is sold (Husnan and Pudjiastuti, 2004). If stock prices are high, firm value
will also be high; and vice versa (Fakhruddin and Hadianto, 2001). The value of the
company can provide maximum prosperity if the stock price increases (Nurlela and
Islahuddin, 2008).
2.6. Hypothesis development
2.6.1. The effect of investor protection on firm value
La Porta et al. (2002) discovered evidence that better legal protection of investors
will increase firm value. When the law better protects stockholders’ rights, outside
investors are willing to pay more for financial assets, such as equity and debt. Based
on La Porta’s research, this study constructed the first hypothesis as follows.
H1: Investor protection has an effect on firm value.
2.6.2. The effect of investor protection on corporate governance
implementation
The Klapper dan Love (2004) empirical test proved that better corporate governance is
highly correlated with better operating performance, and market valuation. Countries
with weak legal environment have lower firm-level governance and performance. This
second premise of this study is based on Klapper and Love’s (2004) arguments.
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H2: Investor Protection has an effect on Corporate Governance Implementation.
2.6.3. The effect of implementation of corporate governance on
firm value
Agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to
the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent
will not always act in the best interests of the principal; there will be some divergence
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare
of the principal ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance principles imple-
mentation has been believed as having an important role to reduce agency conflict.
Good corporate governance performance will increase value added for all parties and
value of the firm as well.
H3: Implementation of Corporate Governance affects Value of The Firm.
2.6.4. The effect of investor protection on the value of
the firm nilai perusahaan regarding corporate governance imple-
mentation as an intervening variable
Klapper dan Love (2004) found that better corporate governance is highly correlated
with better operating performance and market valuation. Their research suggests that
firms can partially compensate for ineffective laws and enforcement by establish-
ing good corporate governance and providing credible investor protection. The next
hypothesis is developed from Klapper and Love’s study.
H4: Investor Protection has an effect on Firm Value regarding implementation of Cor-
porate Governance as an intervening variable.
2.7. Research framework
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3. Research Methods
The dependent variable used in this study is firm value calculated using Tobin’s Q Ratio.
The independent variables in this study are Investor Protection measured by the value
of protection for investors consisting of legal tradition asmeasured by dummy variable,
corporate law, and enforcement measured by the anti-director rights index and securi-
ties law, and there are intervening variables of Corporate Governance consisting of CG
rules and practices, enforcement, political and regulatory environments, accounting,
auditing, and CG cultures.
This study used Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) data in collaboration with
the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), and CLSA Corporate Governance
Watch 2010 and 2012. Investor Protection calculations consist of legal tradition mea-
sured with dummy, corporate law and enforcement variables where corporate law is
measured by an anti-director rights index that has values ranging from 0 to 6, with the
following criteria (La Porta et al., 1997): (1) The ability to vote by mail; (2) The ability
to gain control of shares during investors’ meetings; (3) The possibility of cumulative
voting for directors; (4) The ease of calling an extraordinary investors meeting; (5) The
availability of mechanisms allowingminority investors tomake legal claims against the
directors; (6) The presence of shareholders’ preemptive rights that can be waived only
by a shareholders’ vote.
Countries with anti-director value, an index score of more than or equal to 3, have
good investor protection, and vice versa, while enforcement variables are measured
with values ranging from 0 to 10 with four aspects (La Porta et al., 1998): (1) Efficiency
of the judicial system; (2) Rule of law; (3) Corruption; (4) Risk of expropriation.
The state is considered to have a good investor protection if the average enforce-
ment value is ≥ 5, and vice versa. The variable securities law is measured by three
aspects (La Porta et al., 2006), namely: disclosure requirements; litigation standard,
and public enforcement. The state is considered to have a good investor protection if
the average value of securities law is greater than or equal to 5, and vice versa.
The types of data sources used are secondary data consisting of financial reports and
annual reports listed on the Stock Exchange of ten countries in Asia during 2010 to 2012,
namely Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand. Other data are in the form of investor protection data quoted
from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2006) consisting of legal tradition, corporate law and
enforcement, securities law and country corporate governance score data taken from
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) CG Watch 2010 and 2012.
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The model used in this research is the causality model or the relationship of influ-
ence between research variables with the technique of causality analysis of Structural
Equation Model (SEM) based on component or variance or better known as the Partial
Least Square (PLS) model. Outer model measurement is used with 0.5 factor loading
value on each indicator in the research, while inner model measurement to test the
relationship between variables in research used R-Square value (R2) and relationships
between variables in the system built in the study are calculated using predictive-
relevance (Q2) values (Yamin and Kurniawan, 2011: 124).
The hypothesis test design in this study is presented based on the purpose of the
study t-test hypothesis. In this research, there is an intervening variable, implemen-
tation of corporate governance. Testing of mediation hypothesis can be done by a
procedure developed by Sobel (1982) and known as the Sobel test (Sobel test). Sobel
test is done by testing the indirect effect of independent variable (X) to the dependent
variable (Y) through the intervening variable (Z).
4. Result and Discussion
4.1. Subject general description and research object
The research objects are listed companies on the Stock Exchange in ten Asian countries,
namely Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand. The population used is a company included in the top quar-
tile (score of highest corporate governance) contained in CLSA Corporate Governance
Watch 2010 and 2012, and meeting the criteria specified in the purposive sampling.
Of the 126 companies included in the top quartile of CLSA CG Watch 2010, except for
banking companies, there are 77 companies that meet the criteria determinedwith the
requirements of the presentation of the financial statements and the annual report is
completely presented.
4.2. Descriptive statistic
Based on Table 1, legal tradition (LEGAL) has the lowest value of 0 and the highest
value of 1, with the average legal tradition owned by all sample countries of 0.50
with a standard deviation of 0.513. This shows the distribution of legal tradition data
has a level of variation of 100.26%, which means the data tend to be heterogeneous
(relatively different). While on corporate law (LAW), average enforcement (ENFOR),
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T 1: Descriptive statistic.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
LEGAL 20 0 1 0.50 0.513
LAW 20 2 5 3.80 1.281
ENFOR 20 4 9 6.73 1.693
SECURE 20 5 9 7.03 1.247
RULES 20 35 68 49.40 10.034
ENFO 20 15 68 42.25 14.917
POLIT 20 33 73 54.70 11.712
IGAAP 20 62 88 74.95 7.215
CULTUR 20 25 54 42.65 9.762
TOBINS 20 1.00 3.67 1.6275 0.70397
Valid N (listwise) 20
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
average securities law (SECURE), rules and practices (RULES), enforcement (ENFO),
political and regulatory environment (POLIT), accounting and auditing (IGAAP), CG cul-
ture (CULTUR), and on the proxy value of the company (TOBINS) distribution of data
tends to be homogeneous (relatively similar).
4.3. Model analysis and hypothesis verification
This research uses Structural Equation Model (SEM) with Partial Least Square (PLS)
analysis model to test the hypothesis used. There are steps to the test to examine the
relationship between investor protection variables, corporate governance implemen-
tation and firm value.
4.4. Outer mode measurement estimation
The initial structural model used in this study can be seen in Figure 1.
Based on the result of outer loading factor shown in Figure 2, it can use the outer
loading factor value table for the first iteration. Table 2 describes the reflective value
of the indicator for each variable. It is shown in Table 2 that all proxies have an outer
loading factor greater than 0.5. It can be concluded that all proxies are eligible to be an
indicator that can reflect on each of the corresponding variables. The results in Table
2 can also conclude that the first iteration is the final iteration to determine the proxy
used as a reflective indicator of each variable.
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Figure 1: Initial Structural Model. Source: Processed Data, 2015.
Figure 2: Outer Loading Factor Result. Source: Processed Data, 2015.
4.5. Inner model measurement estimation
Table 3 presents that corporate governance implementation variables have R-Square
(R2) value of 0.589 and R-Square (R2) company value of 0.309. It means that corporate
governance implementation variables can be explained by 58.9% by investor protec-
tion variables, and corporate value variables can be explained by 30.9% by investor
protection variables and corporate governance implementation.
To see the overall relationship of variables in the system built on this research, the
predictive-relevance calculations (Q2) are as follows.
Q2 = 1 – (1 – R2 ICORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION) (1 – R2 FIRM VALUE)
Q2 = 1 – (1 – 0.589) (1 – 0.309)
Q2 = 1 – (0.411) (0.691)
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FIRM VALUE TOBINS 1 SIGNIFICANT
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
T 3: R-Square (R2) Value.





Source: Processed Data, 2015.
Q2 = 1 – 0.284001
Q2 = 0.715999
Based on the calculation of predictive-relevance (Q2), the predictive-relevance (Q2)
value is 0.715999. This shows that the built model can explain the corporate value
phenomena of 71.59%, while the rest is explained by other variables that are not
involved in this study.
4.6. Investor protection influence toward firm value
Based on the results in Table 4, it can be concluded that investor protection does not
affect the value of the company. This can be seen based on p-value greater than 0.1
(0.158 < 0.1). As presented, the value of the estimated original regression coefficient
(original sample) that is equal to 0.629, it can be concluded that investor protection is
positively related to firm value. The positive value of the regression coefficient indi-
cates a unidirectional relationship between investor protection and firm value, where
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if investor protection increases once, then the value of the company will increase by
0.629 times.














0.629 0.445 1.414 0.158
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
Based on the p-value and regression coefficients to see the effect of investor pro-
tection against firm value, it can be concluded that investor protection does not affect
the value of the company. This shows that hypothesis 1 which states that investor
protection has an effect on the company’s value is not proven.
4.7. Investor protection influence toward the corporate
governance implementation
Based on the results in Table 5, it can be concluded that investor protection has an
effect on the implementation of corporate governance. This can be seen based on p-
value smaller than 0.01 (0.000 < 0.01). Based on the value of the estimated original
regression coefficient (original sample) that is equal to 0.782, it can be concluded that
investor protection has a positive effect on the implementation of corporate gover-
nance. The positive value of the regression coefficient shows the one-way relation-
ship between investor protection and the implementation of corporate governance,
where, if investor protection increases once, then the implementation of corporate
governance will increase by 0.782 times.
















0.782 0.114 6.835 0.000
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
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Based on the value of p-value and regression coefficients to see the effect of
investor protection on the implementation of corporate governance, it can be con-
cluded that investor protection has a positive effect on the implementation of corpo-
rate governance. This supports hypothesis 2, which states that investor protection has
a significant effect on the implementation of corporate governance.
4.8. Corporate governance implementation influence to firm value
Based on the results in Table 6, it can be concluded that the implementation of cor-
porate governance affects the value of the company. This can be seen based on p-
value smaller than 0.01 (0.003 < 0.01). Based on the value of the estimated original
regression coefficient (original sample) is –0.969, it can be concluded that the imple-
mentation of corporate governance negatively affects the value of the company. The
negative sign of the regression coefficient shows the opposite relationship between
corporate governance implementation and firm value, where, if the implementation
of corporate governance increases once, then the value of the company will decrease
by 0.969 times.















–0.969 0.322 53.009 0.003
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
Based on the p-value and regression coefficients, it can be concluded that the imple-
mentation of corporate governance negatively affects the value of the company. This
supports hypothesis 3, which states that investor protection has a significant effect on
the implementation of corporate governance.
Investor Protection Influence toward FirmValuewith Corporate Governance Imple-
mentation as the Intervening Variable
Based on the results in Table 7, it can be concluded that the implementation of cor-
porate governance is a variable that can mediate the influence of investor protection
against corporate value. This can be seen based on p-value results that are smaller
than 0.05 (0.015 < 0.05).
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T 7: Sobel test result.












–0.757 0.311 2.434 0.015
Source: Processed Data, 2015.
Based on the estimated value of the regression coefficient (original sample) result-
ing from each relationship, the estimation of regression coefficient of corporate gov-
ernance implementation as a mediating variable is -0.757. It can be concluded that
the implementation of corporate governance has a negative effect in mediating the
influence of investor protection on company value. The negative sign of the regres-
sion coefficient shows a contradictory relationship between corporate governance
implementation and firm value, where, if the implementation of corporate governance
increases once and investor protection remains, then the value of the company will
decrease by 0.757 times.
Based on the value of Sobel Test and regression coefficients, it can be concluded that
the implementation of corporate governance has an effect on mediating the influence
of investor protection against firm value. This indicates that hypothesis 4, which states
that investor protection against corporate value with the implementation of corporate
governance, is not proven.
5. Discussion
5.1. Investor protection influence toward firm value
Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that investor protection has an effect on firm value. The
result of the research shows that investor protection does not have an effect on firm
value and proved significant. Corporate value is not affected by investor protection as
measured by legal tradition (LEGAL), enforcement (ENFOR), corporate law (LAW), and
securities law (SECURE). The results of this research prove that investor protection,
which is information about the power of law in a country that protects investors in the
country, does not affect the value of the company. Investors pay more attention to
information about the return on their investment than information about the protection
of their rights as investors. The belief is that the state has guaranteed their rights as
investors.
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5.2. Investor protection influence toward corporate
governance implementation
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that investor protection affects the implementation of corpo-
rate governance. The result of the research shows that investor protection influences
the implementation of corporate governance and proves significant.
The results of this study prove that the implementation of corporate governance is
a reflection of investor protection in a country and whether or not the implementation
of corporate governance can be seen from the score of corporate governance owned
by the nation. This study proves that there are five measures of corporate governance
implementation that reflect how corporate governance is run to support corporate
governance: CG rules and practices, enforcement, political and regulatory environ-
ments, accounting and auditing, and CG culture. Companies will base on investor pro-
tection of the nation in the making of CG rules and practices because the CG rules
and practices will certainly adapt to the legal basis protecting investors in the nation.
Enforcement in corporate governance is also influenced by investor protection. Poor
investor protection indicates that the enforcement of corporate governance is also not
very strong, and vice versa. Political and regulatory environment reflects the prepa-
ration of corporate governance governed by the state and the process is top-down.
Because the state plays a role in this, the strength of investor protection influences
the political and regulatory environment. Investor protection is also done by the state
through the establishment of institutions that have the authority to set standards; such
institutions should be able to establish an accounting standard that can provide protec-
tion to investors. How companies, investors, intermediaries, non-profit organizations
and media seek to improve corporate governance can be seen from the nation’s CG
culture. The parties in doing business to improve CG culture will certainly pay attention
to how investors are protected in a nation. Therefore, investor protection also affects
CG culture.
The better value of state investor protection as measured through the average
enforcement and corporate law will result in the company better implementing cor-
porate governance. Companies with good investor protection in a nation will also
certainly have a higher standard in corporate governance. Companies with good
investor protection in a nation will be easier to implement corporate governance.
This is because companies can adopt provisions that are similar to the law in that
nation.
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The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Klapper and Love
(2004) who found the influence of investor protection against corporate governance
ranking. Wardhani (2009) also found that investor protection influences the corporate
governance index.
This research, in accordancewith the research of Klapper and Love (2004) andWard-
hani (2009), reinforces the assertion that protecting investors influences the imple-
mentation of corporate governance. The better investor protection the nation makes,
the better standard of corporate governance and its implementation. If the law on
investor protection is not good, it will be difficult to improve the corporate legal envi-
ronment, which can impact on the difficulty of maximizing corporate governance.
5.3. Corporate governance implementation influence toward
firm value
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that the implementation of corporate governance affects
the value of the company. The result shows that the implementation of corporate
governance affects the value of the company and is proved significant. The result
of this research proves that the value of the company is a reflection of corporate
governance implementation. Company value is measured by looking at the ratio of
the market value of the company’s assets to the value of the replacement of the
company’s assets. This ratio is considered to provide good information because it can
explain the phenomenon in corporate activities. Companies with high value show that
the company has a good growth prospect. CG rules and practices affect the value of the
company because, if the rules and practices of corporate governance are donewell, the
companywill bemanaged excellently aswell. This will affect the value of the company.
Enforcement in corporate governance is very important. Sometimes companies have
corporate governance rules, but they are not implemented maximally because com-
panies do so only to comply with regulations. This is certainly not in line with the initial
goal of corporate governance. Good enforcement will prevent the occurrence of things
like this. Strong enforcement will lead the implementation of corporate governance to
bemaximized and will impact on rising corporate value. A good political and regulatory
environment will support the implementation of corporate governance as corporate
governance is influenced by how the country’s laws and regulations are governed. A
good legal environment will strengthen corporate governance. The existence of stan-
dards governing companies that must use International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA) makes accounting and auditing
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play a role in shaping company value. Companies that meet these standards well will
earn the trust of higher investors, which will affect the value of the company. A good
CG culture will get the company to implement corporate governance optimally and
continue to improve corporate governance as well. In countries with high corporate
governance scores, firms should adopt good corporate governance aswell. In countries
with low corporate governance scores, firms will maximize the company’s manage-
ment so that companies can still demonstrate to investors that the company has good
prospects.
The results of this study are in line with Klapper and Love’s (2004) research that
found that corporate governance has an influence on firm value. Siallagan and Mach-
foedz (2006) also found that corporate governance mechanisms influence firm value.
This research, in line with Klapper and Love (2004) and Siallagan and Machfoedz
(2006), reinforces the assertion that the implementation of corporate governance
affects firm value. Implementation of corporate governance is one form of corporate
compliance to the rules, but, if the implementation of corporate governance is done
properly and to the maximum, it can better affect the value of the company.
Investor Protection Influence toward FirmValuewith Corporate Governance Imple-
mentation as the Intervening Variable
Hypothesis 4 (H4) states that investor protection influences corporate value with
the implementation of corporate governance as the intervening variable. The result
shows the investor protection influence of corporate value with the implementation of
corporate governance as the mediating variable, but it is not strong enough to become
an intervening variable. This is because there is no direct influence between investor
protections against corporate value.
Investor protection does not affect the value of the company. Investors, while
investing, do not pay attention to the protection of investors’ rights as they are
convinced that their rights are protected by the state. Implementation of corporate
governance is a reflection of corporate management. Companies in countries with
low corporate governance scores will seek to improve corporate governance at the
enterprise level. This is so that investors still believe that they will get a good return
from the company. If the company has good corporate governance, it will be shown
by a high corporate value. This is in accordance with the results of research by Klapper
and Love (2004) and Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006).
This research proves that investor protection is not a matter of concern by investors
when investing in a country. However, investor protection affects the implementation
of corporate governance in a country. The implementation of corporate governance
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attracts investors, because it also affects how the company is managed. Companies, if
managed properly, will increase investor confidence, which means the company will
find it easier in getting funding, so the impact can be seen from the good company
value.
6. Conclusion
Based on the results of testing and analysis, it shows that investor protection does not
affect the value of the company and proved significant. Investors paymore attention to
information about returns on their investments than information about protecting their
rights as investors. Investors are convinced that the state has guaranteed their rights as
investors. On the other hand, the result of the analysis shows that investor protection
influences the implementation of corporate governance and proves significant.
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